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2 - U.S. Naval Postgraduate School • PROBLEM: How to tractably verify security 
requirements in hardware.   
• GOAL: Express and enforce security 
requirements in a processor design.   
• IDEAS:  
• Use assertions in the Property 
Specification Language (PSL) to map 
architectural security requirements to a 
processor's implementation.  
• Convert the PSL assertions into 
synthesizable HDL checkers, and add 
them to the design. 
• Run the processor testbench with 
coverage. Detect policy violations with 
the checkers, using coverage to isolate 
unused circuits for further analysis. 
• ANTICIPATED BENEFITS: The ability to 
detect some hardware malicious 
inclusions, while greatly reducing the 
portion of a design that must be analyzed 
manually. 
• FUTURE RESEARCH: Evaluate on more 
processor platforms. Experiment against 
adversary malicious-inclusion designers. 
Fabricate demonstrations in silicon. 
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